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Monopolistic competitionMany trade models of monopolistic competition identify cost efﬁciency as the main determinant of ﬁrm perfor-
mance in exportmarkets. To date, the analysis of demand factors has receivedmuch less attention.We propose a
new model where consumer preferences are asymmetric across varieties and heterogeneous across countries.
The model generates new predictions and allows for an identiﬁcation of horizontal differentiation (taste) clearly
distinguished from vertical differentiation (quality). Data patterns observed in Belgian ﬁrm–product level
exports by destination are congruent with the predictions and seem to warrant a richer modelling of consumer
demand.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 1. Introduction
Many existing trade models of monopolistic competition identify
cost efﬁciency as the main determinant of ﬁrm performance in export
markets. In contrast, the analysis of demand factors has received lessinsightful remarks and sugges-
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V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND licattention. Demand is typically assumed to be symmetric across varieties
and countries. This symmetry in demand is imposed on very different
products sold within the same country as well as for the same goods
sold across different countries. These restrictive assumptions have led
scholars to introduce random ﬁrm and country-speciﬁc shocks to
match features of the data.1
The purpose of this paper is to relax the symmetric demand assump-
tion in a love-for-variety trade model by allowing consumers in export
markets to differ in two major respects. First, the demand function is
allowed to vary across varieties within a destination country. This
amounts to assuming that preferences are asymmetric. For example, sup-
pose that the set of differentiated varieties is types of beers. Under
asymmetric preferences, we allow the demand faced by Heineken to
be different from the demand faced by Budweiser in a particular coun-
try. Second, the demand function can vary for the same variety across
destination countries, depending on consumer taste and product char-
acteristics. This amounts to assuming that consumers across countries1 Bernard et al. (2011), Hallak and Sivadasan (2013) and Munch and Nguyen
(forthcoming).
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stronger than the demand for Budweiser in one country, but it can be
the opposite in another country where both beers are also sold.
Although ﬁrm heterogeneity in efﬁciency has empirically been con-
ﬁrmed to be very important in explaining ﬁrms' entry into export mar-
kets, this seems less the case for ﬁrm-level sales variation in different
countries conditioning upon entry. Several papers analyzing the
variability in ﬁrm-level prices and sales across a range of export destina-
tions have reached the conclusion that cost factors alone cannot account
for all the variation in the data and conclude that demand factors are
important too.2 In this paper we aim to rationalize the observed ﬁrm-
destination variation by supplementing ﬁrm heterogeneity in costs
with consumer heterogeneity. We do so by allowing each destination
country to have a different set of asymmetric preferences over the vari-
eties on offer. This is achieved in a simple and intuitive way in the qua-
dratic utility used by Ottaviano et al. (2002), Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008), and others.We build themodel in two steps. We ﬁrst introduce
asymmetry in preferences across varieties within one country. Next, we
allow every country to be characterized by a different set of asymmetric
preferences across varieties. Hence, each variety has a country-speciﬁc
demand, which offers an explanation for the strong variation observed
in the quantities of identical varieties sold in various countries.
It is important to point out that varying variety–country sales need
not result from market size differences nor from income differences,
but from asymmetric preferences between varieties and taste heteroge-
neity across countries. Put differently, whereas in Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) ﬁrm–product–quantity variation across destinations may result
from varying market size or from a varying number of competing vari-
eties by destination, the new preferences introduced here show that
even when exporting to a country of similar size, similar income level
and the same number of competing varieties, quantities shipped may
still vary due to taste differences affecting the market outcome in a
way that has not been considered before.
In addition to ﬁrm–product heterogeneity in cost and taste, we also
allow consumer preferences to be asymmetric in quality differences be-
tween varieties.3 Without quality differentiation, the model would
wrongly attribute thehigh sales of high priced varietieswithin a country
entirely to taste differences, which is unlikely. Since quality also affects
demand, it should be incorporated in the model in order to allow for a
correct identiﬁcation of taste effects. The model does not impose any
correlation between cost, taste and quality but allows these parameters
tomove freely and independently of each other. For example, we do not
impose any relationship between marginal cost and the quality of a va-
riety, thus allowing higher quality to either stem from ﬁxed costs such
as investment in research and development or from the use of higher-
quality and more expensive inputs. Nor do we impose a relationship
between taste and quality. Thus, while both quality and taste affect
the demand for a variety, they may work in opposite directions. The
demand for a variety is thus ultimately determined by the interplay of
the quality and taste.
Clear deﬁnitions of horizontal and vertical differentiation until now
only exist in discrete choice models with indivisible varieties and with
consumers making mutually exclusive choices, used in Industrial
organization (Tirole, 1988) and, more recently, in trade (Khandelwal,
2010; Fajgelbaum et al., 2011). Discrete choice models incorporate
both types of differentiation (Anderson et al., 1992). In contrast, a
clear distinction between horizontal (taste) and vertical (quality) differ-
entiation is largely absent in models where consumers have a love-for-2 Based on French data, Eaton et al. (2011) ﬁnd that ﬁrm efﬁciency is not the main de-
terminant of sales variation across markets (see also Brooks, 2006). Similarly, Kee and
Krishna (2008) ﬁnd that the correlation between ﬁrm-level sales of Bangladeshi ﬁrms in
different destination markets is close to zero.
3 There are two strands of literature on that. The ﬁrst one is about quality in the CES,
such as Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Johnson (2012), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012),
and Verhoogen (2008). The second one is about quality in quadratic preferences, such as
Foster et al. (2008) and Eckel et al. (2011).variety and purchase many products in varying quantities. This is what
we aim to accomplish in this paper where we propose love-for-variety
preferences that include horizontal and vertical differentiation, which
we refer to as verti-zontal preferences. Typically, varieties of the same
good are horizontally differentiated when there is no common ranking
across consumers when varieties are equally priced. In other words,
horizontal differentiation reﬂects consumers' tastes that affect how
much ﬁrms can sell of each variety. In contrast, varieties are vertically
differentiated when all consumers agree on their ranking, and thus
quality affects prices in all destination countries.
Unlike discrete choicemodels, we do not aggregate utility over indi-
vidual consumers within a country but insteadwork with a representa-
tive consumer per country. This approach is predominantly data driven
since shipments in trade by ﬁrm–product are typically only available at
destination country-level. Our model is not unique in explaining the
quantity variation observed in the data, but we will discuss why it is
the single one to explain the joint variation in price and quantity of
exported ﬁrm–products in the data (Section 4.3).
The introduction of asymmetries in quadratic utility and of hetero-
geneity across representative consumers results in a number of appeal-
ing features.
First, horizontal differentiation in our model is captured by one single
parameter that varies across varieties and consumers for which we pro-
vide a micro-foundation that goes back to spatial models of product dif-
ferentiation à la Hotelling (1929). This approach allows us to determine
precisely how this parameter affects demand and sales asymmetrically.
This concurs with Vogel (2008) who developed a Hotelling-like model
with cost-heterogeneous ﬁrms and showed that ﬁrms choose asymmet-
ric locations in the linear city model. Therefore, the model we propose in
this paper may be viewed as an attempt at reconciling Chamberlin and
Hotelling.
Second, our analysis generalizes quasi-linear preferences to in-
troduce demand heterogeneity in a way that permits a separate
identiﬁcation of horizontal and vertical differentiation in a particular
sense: the consumer-speciﬁc parameter of horizontal differentiation
only affects equilibrium quantities but not prices. Thus, horizontal dif-
ferentiation can be separated from vertical differentiation at the ﬁrm–
product–country level and can empirically be distinguished by any
researcher with access to data on ﬁrm characteristics. Horizontal differ-
entiation in CES models cannot explain variation in sales for the same
ﬁrm–product across countries because the elasticity of substitution is
constant across varieties. To remedy for this, one can introduce a
ﬁrm–product speciﬁc demand shock per country that accounts for
sales variation of the same ﬁrm–product across countries without af-
fecting prices. Horizontal differentiation between products is then the
combination of a constant parameter of substitution and a variable
shock at the ﬁrm–product level. Because the parameter of substitution
also enters the price equation, a clear separation of horizontal and ver-
tical differentiation is difﬁcult to attainwith the CES. Therefore we need
a set of preferences which allows for a clear separation of quality and
taste since both shift demand in different ways. Otherwise quality dif-
ferences between varieties could be confounded with taste differences,
and vice versa. In this paper we show that taste differences can shift
demand without affecting price, while quality differences always
imply a price change.
Third, asymmetric preferences in quadratic utility also result in a
richer set of country-speciﬁc competition effects. With symmetric pref-
erences, competition effects are a sole function of the number of ﬁrms in
the destination country, which depends on market size. Allowing for
asymmetric preferences generates competition effects that nowalso de-
pend on the quality of the varieties on offer in the destination country
and their interactionwith local tastes. In addition, allowing for consum-
er heterogeneity across countries implies that two countries of similar
size and GDP can still be subject to varying levels of competition. Even
when the quality on offer in these two countries is the same, competi-
tion effects can differ because in one country high quality varieties
4 Different from Ottaviano et al. (2002), the parameter β used here captures the degree
of horizontal differentiation net of the substitutability among varieties.
5 Normalizingα to 1 in Eq. (1) is not a problem. By contrast,whenα is variety-speciﬁc as
in Eq. (2), normalizing α(s) to 1 is problematic because we may end up with variety-
speciﬁc units, e.g. kilograms for some varieties and tons for the others, which is notmean-
ingful. In the empirical section, we always measure quantities in the same unit.
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and taste across varieties and taste heterogeneity across countries also
generates market structures ranging frommonopoly to perfect compe-
tition. This is shown by deﬁning several market aggregates, which to-
gether capture the extent of country-speciﬁc competition effects. All in
all, the new preferences presented here provide a link to the industrial
organization literature where market structure is more central than in
standard trade models.
Fourth, our main objective is to better describe consumers' choices.
Selection issues and zero trade ﬂows in exports, whose importance
have recently been discussed in the trade literature (e.g. Helpman
et al., 2008), do not alter the main message of this paper. In other
words, a richer supply side and various entry settings can be added to
our model without changing our main results. Heterogeneous con-
sumers across countries with asymmetric preferences across varieties
sufﬁce to rationalize the observed export prices and quantities of indi-
vidual varieties shipped across countries. We disregard market partici-
pation issues because our results hold for any number of varieties
present in destination countries and any distribution of the quality and
taste parameters.
Last, since the parameters stem directly from the utility function, we
can provide a clear micro-foundation for them, which improves upon
the ﬁrm and country-speciﬁc shock approach that has been used in em-
pirical work to ﬁt the data but that has little theoretical underpinnings.
The parameters of the new model that we propose can be written as a
function of observables and no distributional functional forms for de-
mand shocks need to be made. This also leads to identiﬁable structural
parameters on quality and taste that account for parallel and slope
shifters in demand. This offers possibilities for quantifying the primi-
tives of the model and for comparing them with alternative explana-
tions put forward in the literature in order to assess their relative
importance in explaining the strong quantity variation of identical vari-
eties across countries.
Our empirical analysis aims to verifywhether the data are consistent
with the verti-zontal model. For this purpose we use a cross-sectional
analysis of ﬁrm–product exports by destination shipped from Belgium,
where products are available at the 8-digit level. While our data may
suffer frommeasurement error, especially in quantities, several robust-
ness checks are carried out tominimize its role. Ourﬁndings are congru-
ent with the verti-zontal model. However, we acknowledge that
alternative explanations may also be at work. While taste differences
offer a plausible explanation for an empirical regularity hitherto not
well understood, futurework should be aimed at disentangling taste ef-
fects from other potential explanations. A full identiﬁcation of the
model's parameters would require a much richer dataset and is left for
future research.
The next section ﬁrst discusses the standard quadratic utility before
introducing the new consumer preferences. Section 3 discusses market
equilibria and parameter identiﬁcation. Section 4 uses ﬁrm–product
level cross-sectional exports data for Belgium to explore data patterns.
Section 5 concludes.
2. The consumer program
2.1. The standard quadratic utility
Consider an economy endowed with a set I of consumers and two
goods - a differentiated good supplied as a continuum S of varieties
and the numéraire. In the existing literature using the quadratic utility,
consumers share the same preferences given by
U ¼ α
Z
S
q sð Þds−β
2
Z
S
q sð Þ½ 2ds−γ
2
Z
S
q sð Þds
2
þ q0:

ð1Þ
In this expression, the utility depends on the consumption q(s) of va-
riety s belonging to a set S of differentiated varieties and on theconsumption q0 of the numéraire. The parameter α N 0 captures the
preference for the differentiated good with respect to the numéraire,
while γ N 0 is the degree of substitutability between any pair of varieties
in S: a higherγmeans that varieties are closer substitutes. The quadratic
utility function exhibits a love for varietywhose intensity ismeasured by
the value of the parameter β N 0.4 An important property of Eq. (1) is
that the three parameters are identical for all varieties. Thus, two
implicit assumptions are made. First, all varieties face the same demand
in each country. Second, any particular variety faces the same demand
no matter which country it is sold in. In other words, all varieties enter
consumer preferences symmetrically around the world, which is clearly
restrictive. In terms of our beer example, symmetric preferences amounts
to assuming that Heineken and Budweiser face exactly the same demand
within a country and this in every country they are sold in.
2.2. The quadratic utility with verti-zontal preferences
We now relax the symmetry assumption within a country, but con-
tinue to assume homogeneous consumers across countries. In terms of
our beer example, this means that we allow varieties Heineken and
Budweiser to face a different demand within a country, depending on
their quality and the taste for them, but the demand for each individual
beer variety is the same across countries. As such the extent to which
each beer is liked (or disliked) is the same for all consumers. In
Subsection 2.4, where we introduce heterogenous consumers, the
preference of one beer over another is also allowed to vary by country.
Under asymmetric preferences, but with homogeneous consumers
everywhere, the quadratic utility (1) is extended as follows:
U ¼
Z
S
α sð Þq sð Þds−1
2
Z
S
β sð Þ q sð Þ½ 2ds−γ
2
Z
S
q sð Þds
2
þ q0:

ð2Þ
The quadratic utility (2) differs from Eq. (1) by the fact that param-
eters α and β now depend on s, which indicates that they are variety-
speciﬁc. Units in which varieties are measured are the same, kilograms
of chocolate, bottles of beer and the like. So, we compare one unit of
each variety with one unit of another.5 While notationally Eqs. (2) and
(1) may not appear all that different, Eq. (2) represents a very different
set of preferences. To justify Eq. (2), we ﬁnd it is important to offer a
clear interpretation for the parameters and do so by discussing their
micro-foundations in detail. We ﬁrst show that β(s) captures the idea
of “taste mismatch” between the consumer and variety s, thus charac-
terizing the extent of idiosyncratic horizontal differentiation across
varieties.
2.2.1. Taste mismatch (β(s))
In the product characteristics space, the distance to the shop reﬂects
taste mismatch between a consumer's ideal variety and the one on offer
in the shop's location. Introducing love-for-variety into Hotelling's
(1929) model by giving the consumer a utility function as in Eq. (2),
as the consumers are allowed to visit more than one shop, we can also
show that the parameter β(s) corresponds to the distance that a con-
sumer has to travel to reach the shop. As a result, we can interpret
β(s) in Eq. (2) as a parameter expressing the mismatch between the
horizontal characteristics of variety s and this consumer's ideal. Thus,
we show that the deﬁnition of horizontal differentiation in the context
of indivisible varieties, with consumers making mutually exclusive
choices, concurswith the deﬁnition of horizontal differentiation in pref-
erences where consumers buy more than one variety and the
53F. Di Comite et al. / Journal of International Economics 93 (2014) 50–66differentiated goods are divisible. By drawing a parallel between the
taste parameter β(s) and the distance a consumer has to travel to a
shop, like in the Hotelling setting, we get a clear interpretation for this
parameter. This spatial metaphor, which is important for the micro-
foundation of the parameter in βi(s) (Eq. (2)), is developed in detail in
the appendix.6
2.2.2. Quality (α(s))
The parameter α in both Eqs. (1) and (2) corresponds to consumers'
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the ﬁrst unit of variety s in the absence of
substitutable varieties. While in the standard quadratic utility, as for ex-
ample in Eq. (1), the quality of all varieties is assumed to be the same, in
Eq. (2) we now allow the quality of each variety to be unique. To better
explain the interpretation of α(s), consider the case of two varieties, s
and r, whose degree of substitutability is captured by the parameter
γ N 0. In this case, a consumer's utility is equal to
U ¼ α sð Þq sð Þ−β sð Þ
2
q sð Þ½ 2 þ α rð Þq rð Þ−β rð Þ
2
q rð Þ½ 2−γ
2
q rð Þq sð Þ þ q0: ð3Þ
In Eq. (3), α(s)− γq(r)/2 is the marginal utility derived from con-
suming an arbitrarily small amount of variety swhen q(r) units of vari-
ety r are consumed. This marginal utility varies inversely with the
consumption of the other variety because the consumer has a lower val-
uation for variety s when her consumption of its substitute r is larger.
Note that the intercept α(s)-γq(r)/2 of the demand function for variety
s is positive provided that its desirability (α(s)) dominates the negative
impact of the consumption of the other variety, q(r), weighted by the
degree of substitutability between the two varieties (γ).
The budget constraint is
p rð Þq rð Þ þ p sð Þq sð Þ þ q0 ¼ y
where p(r) and p(s) are the prices of varieties r and s respectively, and y
is income. Plugging the budget constraint in Eq. (3) and differentiating
with respect to q(s) yields the inverse demand for variety s:
p sð Þ ¼ α sð Þ−γ
2
q rð Þ−β sð Þq sð Þ:
Following the literature, we now deﬁne two varieties as vertically
differentiated when all consumers view the vertical characteristics of
variety s as dominating those of variety r. Therefore, in linewith the def-
inition of vertical differentiation, we say that varieties s and r are verti-
cally differentiated when theWTP for the ﬁrst marginal unit of variety s
exceeds that of variety r, i.e. α(s) N α(r).7 Because a higher α(s) implies
that the WTP for variety s increases regardless of the quantity con-
sumed, α(s) can be interpreted as an index of the quality of this variety.
Since the WTP for a variety decreases with its level of consumption, an
alternative deﬁnition would be to say that varieties s and r are vertically
differentiated when α(s)− β(s)q N α(r)− β(r)q for all q N 0. However,
this deﬁnition overlaps with the very deﬁnition of the WTP that cap-
tures more features than vertical attributes, such as the quantity con-
sumed. Furthermore, we will see that the equilibrium price of variety s
always increases with α(s), which we ﬁnd sufﬁcient to express the
idea that a higher quality variety is expected to be priced at a higher
level.86 Another interpretation of β(s) is related to the concavity of the variety-speciﬁc utility
function. As the mismatch between variety s and the consumer's ideal increases, it is nat-
ural to expect the consumer'smarginal utility to decrease faster. This can be seen bydiffer-
entiating Eq. (2) with respect to q(s).
7 Richer consumers have a higherWTP for all varieties, but this does not affect the rank-
ing in a particular destination.
8 Our approach is thus consistent with Aw et al. (2001) and Eckel and Neary (2010)
who assume that quality is intrinsic to a ﬁrm. However, unlike these authors, we allow
quality to vary by variety s. This issue has been tackled in a handful of papers (for example,
Hallak and Sivadasan, 2013).2.2.3. Substitutability (γ)
This brings us to the parameter γ. Allowing it to vary across varieties,
while analytically feasible, would be cumbersome and difﬁcult to
measure empirically as it would amount to identifying a level of substi-
tutability for each and every pair of varieties in the market. We thus fol-
low a pragmatic approach and assume the degree of substitutability
between varieties to be deﬁned at the product level andnot to vary across
varieties of this product. Thus, we allow the beer market to have a differ-
ent γ than the chocolates market, but we assume γ between beer varie-
ties to be the same. In terms of our beer example, parameter γ captures
the fact that Heineken and Budweiser are similarly imperfect substitutes
in every country where they are sold, but the parameters α(s) and β(s)
allowHeineken andBudweiser to enter consumer preferences differently
in every country they are sold in.While this is a simpliﬁcation that should
be pointed out, it seems a plausible one. The analytical beneﬁt of keeping
γ constant will become clear when we discuss competition effects.
2.3. Consumer optimization
Let us now proceed with the maximization of the utility in Eq. (2)
when a consumer faces the set S of varieties. Plugging the budget con-
straint
Z
S
p sð Þq sð Þdsþ q0 ¼ y
in Eq. (2) and differentiating with respect to q(s) yields the inverse
demand for variety s:
p sð Þ ¼ α sð Þ−γ
2
Q−β sð Þq sð Þ ð4Þ
where
Q ¼
Z
S
q rð Þdr
is the per-capita total consumption of the differentiated good, which
acts as a demand shifter for variety s. Note that α(s) also shifts the inter-
cept of the inverse demand, while β(s) affects its slope.
Using Eq. (4), we readily see that the demand for variety s may be
written as follows:
q sð Þ ¼ α sð Þ−p sð Þ
β sð Þ −
γ A−ℙð Þ
β sð Þ 1þ γℕð Þ ð5Þ
where
ℕ ≡
Z
S
ds
β sð Þ A≡
Z
S
α sð Þ
β sð Þ ds ℙ ≡
Z
S
p sð Þ
β sð Þds: ð6Þ
Thus, like inmostmodels of monopolistic competition, the individu-
al demand for a variety (Eq. (5)) depends on a few market aggregates,
here ℕ, A and ℙ. Using the spatial interpretation of β(s) given above, it
is straightforward that a group of varieties r, characterized by small
(large) values of β(r), have a strong (weak) impact on the demand for
variety s because consumers are (not) willing to buy much of them, as
they (dis)like its horizontal characteristics better than those of r. This
explains why β(s) appears in the denominator of the aggregates ℕ, A
and ℙ.
Each variety is weighted by the inverse of its taste mismatch β(s) to
determine the effectivemass of varieties, given byℕ. It is ℕ, and not the
unweighted mass of varieties N, which affects the consumers' demand
for a given variety. Indeed, adding or deleting varieties with bad taste
matches does not affect much the demand for the others, whereas the
opposite holds when the match is good. Note also that the effective
mass of varieties ℕ may be larger or smaller than the unweighted
mass of varieties N in the product market, according to the distribution
9 Using Hotelling's spatial metaphor developed in Appendix A, the distance (1,i) be-
tween shop 1 and consumer i's ideal differs from the distance β(1,j) to consumer j's ideal.
10 Since our model deals with heterogeneity at a ﬁrm-product level, ﬁrms can be either
single product or multi-product. As in Bernard et al. (2011), we assume that each ﬁrm-
product has a different marginal cost that is constant. We leave more complex multi-
product issues, such as cannibalization and core competencies studied respectively in
Eckel and Neary (2010) and Mayer et al. (2012), for future research.
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weighted by the inverse of its tastemismatch to determine the effective
quality index A and the effective price index ℙ. In particular, varieties
displaying the same quality (or price) may have a very different impact
on the demand for other varieties according to their taste mismatches.
The aggregate indices in Eq. (6) show that taste heterogeneity across va-
rieties affects demand and, therefore, the market outcome. This shows
that preferences (Eq. (2)) are asymmetric and capture several of the
main features of the Lancasterian approach to product differentiation,
such as different degrees of substitution between varieties, when varie-
ties are asymmetrically located in the product characteristics space.
Note, ﬁnally, that Eq. (5) implies that the total mass of varieties con-
sumed is given by
Q ¼ A−ℙ
1þ γℕ ð7Þ
which shows once more how the utility of a variety depends on the dis-
tribution of the taste parameter β(s) since all the aggregate indices enter
into Q. Incidentally, note that the deﬁnition of Q corresponds to the sec-
ond term in the right-hand side of Eq. (5), where it is weighted by the
ratio γ/β(s). Thus, the largerQ, the tougher the competition that each va-
riety s faces and the smaller its demand. For example, competition effects
are strongerwhenever the aggregate qualityA is higher. As a result, if the
aggregate quality goes up this will reduce the demand for each variety.
This may lower the WTP for a particular variety by so much that the
choke price of this variety falls below its costs, thus driving this variety
out of business. This channel of ﬁrm–product exit was hitherto missing
inmodels where the level of quality was not included in the competition
effects and, therefore, could not affect the exit (or entry) of products.
The above discussion shows that it is possible to introduce asymme-
try across varieties in demand in a very simple way. As will be seen,
preferences (Eq. (2)) also generate a large array of new effects. The de-
mand for a variety s now depends on its own horizontal and vertical at-
tributes as well as on the effective mass of competing varieties (ℕ), the
aggregate effective quality (A) and the effective price index (ℙ). The in-
terplay between these aggregate indices determines how a particular
varietymeets the competition.
Standard deﬁnitions of horizontal and vertical differentiations exist for
indivisible varieties and with consumers making mutually exclusive
choices. But these concepts until nowwere largely absent inmodels guid-
ing the majority of empirical works in trade. Therefore, we consider the
verti-zontal preferences particularly useful for those researchers who are
interested inmeasuring anddistinguishing horizontal (taste) fromvertical
(quality) attributes in trade. In contrast, in the standard quadratic utility,
the common β assigned to all the varieties affects both price and quantity
sold of each variety,whichmakes it difﬁcult to interpret it as a true param-
eter of horizontal differentiation. With the new and richer set of prefer-
ences introduced here, that distinction can now be made more clearly.
2.4. Heterogeneous consumers
Thus far, we have considered a set I of homogeneous consumers. But
now we relax this assumption and allow consumers to be heteroge-
neous. In terms of our beer example, allowing for heterogeneous con-
sumers amounts to assuming that a representative consumer in one
country may prefer Budweiser to Heineken, whereas a consumer in
another country may prefer Heineken to Budweiser.
Formally this means that we allow the β-distribution to vary with i∈ I.
Thus, from this point forward, the taste-mismatch associatedwith a variety
is consumer-speciﬁc. This implies that imust nowenter the tastemismatch
parameter β(s,i) to reﬂect the heterogeneity of consumers. Thus,
taste mismatch is two-dimensional: it varies across varieties s ∈ S as well
as across consumers i ∈ I. That β(s,i) varies with smeans that the same
consumer i has different attitudes toward different varieties (preferences
are asymmetric), whereasβ(s,i)varieswith i because different consumershave different attitudes toward the same variety s (consumers are
heterogeneous).
Ourmain focus being on international trade,we followmost of this lit-
erature and assume that aggregate demands stemming from one country
are derived from themaximization of a representative consumer's utility,
such as Eq. (2). As a consequence, in this paper there is consumer hetero-
geneity between countries butnotwithin countries. Although aggregating
consumer preferences within a country is a priori doable, we do not ad-
dress this issue here for data reasons. Indeed, if the distribution of β(s,i)
with respect to i were known, we could aggregate individual demands
across consumers living in the same country and capture consumer het-
erogeneity within countries. This is exactly what is accomplished in the
discrete choice literature where demand shocks are idiosyncratic to indi-
vidual consumers, while aggregating demands across individuals yields
the market demand when the distribution of shocks is extreme value.9
We propose an alternative approach, which is more in line with the
standard trade literature. In addition, our model allows for a simple de-
scription of consumers buying a variable number of units of each varie-
ty, somethingwhich is not easy to performwith discrete choicemodels.
Note also that using discrete choicemodelswhen preferences across va-
rieties are asymmetric is not an easy task. Most of the existing theoret-
ical literature developed in industrial organization uses themultinomial
logit, which assumes symmetry. Using the probit with different covari-
ances turns out to be especially cumbersome, whereas our approach
leads to simple and intuitive results.We see this as a strong comparative
advantage of the verti-zontal model.
Our model can be used at different levels of demand aggregation,
i.e. a household, a city, or a country. This makes it a potentially useful
tool to address alternative issues, especially when data are available
at a very disaggregated level such as barcode data within cities
(Handbury and Weinstein, 2013). In what follows, we interpret a
consumer as a country's representative consumer. To be precise,
we consider I = {1,…,n} as the set of destination countries and Si as
the set of varieties available in country i. In such a context, our approach
offers new insights into competition effects. Based on the standard qua-
dratic utility given in Eq. (1), country size determines the number of va-
rieties and, therefore, the competition effects. Allowing for consumer
heterogeneity and asymmetric preferences across countries, as we do
here, adds another dimension of competitiveness, taste mismatch and
quality. In Melitz and Ottaviano's (2008) type of models, two countries
of similar size and GDPwould have identical competition effects. Under
the system of preferences we present here, this will not be the case, i.e.,
it will also depend on the quality of the varieties on offer and on their
interaction with local preferences. Even with the same market size,
the same number of ﬁrms, and the same quality on offer, this could
still result in different competition effects because in one country one
set of varieties match better local taste than in the others.
Because i is nowan index that varies from1 to ndestinationmarkets,
we will replace β(s,i) with βi(s). Prices and quantities will similarly be
denoted pi(s) and qi(s), whereas the market aggregates Ni, Ai and Pi
are indexed by i only. This notation is also more convenient in the em-
pirical analysis undertaken in Section 4.3. Firm optimization and market outcome
Because the vertical and horizontal attributes and the marginal cost
c(s) vary across varieties, ﬁrms are heterogeneous along these three di-
mensions.10 Firms can be thought of as exporters of a particular country
11 This parameter can be nicely related to the existence of different price ranges across
sectors observedbyKhandelwal (2010). Noting that each variety is characterized by an id-
iosyncratic quality and cost parameter, we can show that, paraphrasing Khandelwal, it is
the length of the markup ladder that varies across sectors in our model: the tougher the
competition, the shorter the ladder.
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analysis holds true when trade costs are incorporated. Indeed, it is suf-
ﬁcient to replace c(s) with ci(s) = c(s) + ti, where ti is the cost of ship-
ping one unit of variety s to country i. But we refrain from including
trade costs everywhere for the sake of clarity of exposition. Empirically,
trade costs will be captured by product-destination speciﬁc dummies,
which amounts to assuming that trade costs are the same for all varie-
ties of a given product exported from the same country of origin to
the same destination, which seems plausible.
3.1. Proﬁt maximization
The operating proﬁts earned from selling variety s in country i can be
written as follows:
Πi sð Þ ¼ pi sð Þ−c sð Þ½ qi sð Þ:
Note that in ourmodelmarkets are segmented, so that qi(s) and pi(s)
differ according to the destination country the ﬁrm exports its variety
to.
Let Si be the set of varieties available in country i. The beneﬁts of
using quasi-linear preferences are reaped here since ﬁrms' proﬁts affect
only the consumption of the numéraire regardless of their level and the
way proﬁts are determined. As a consequence, the analysis of the equi-
librium provided below is robust against different modeling entry
strategies.
Because the variety s is negligible to themarket, differentiatingΠi(s)
with respect to pi(s) yields:
pi s;ℙið Þ ¼
α sð Þ þ c sð Þ
2
− γ Ai−ℙið Þ
2 1þ γℕið Þ
: ð8Þ
The natural interpretation of Eq. (8) is that it represents ﬁrms′ best-
reply to themarket conditions in country i. These conditions are deﬁned
by the aggregate behavior of all producers, which is summarized here
by the price index ℙi. The best-reply function is upward sloping because
varieties are substitutes: a rise in the effective price index ℙi relaxes
price competition and enables each ﬁrm to sell its variety at a higher
price. By shifting the best reply downward, a larger effective mass ℕi
of ﬁrms makes competition tougher and reduces prices.
In contrast, since we do not deal with ﬁrms' quality choice, Ai is ex-
ogenously determined by the distributions of quality (α(s)) and tastes
(βi(s)) over Si. In particular, when the quality index Ai rises, each ﬁrm
faces competing varieties which together represent a higher aggregate
quality, thus making the market penetration of a particular variety
harder. Note also that Ai affects prices positively, even though it affects
each individual variety's price negatively. This implies that an increase
in aggregate quality in a country raises price levels, but makes it harder
for an individual variety to survive. Thus, through market aggregates,
wemanage to reconcileweak interactions undermonopolistic competi-
tion with several of the main features of Hotelling-like models of prod-
uct differentiation.
Integrating Eq. (8) over Si shows that the equilibriumprice index can
be expressed in terms of the aggregate indices Ai, ℂi and ℕi:
ℙi ¼ ℂi þ
Ai−ℂi
2þ γℕi
ð9Þ
where the cost index ℂi is deﬁned as follows:
ℂi ≡
Z
Si
c sð Þ
βi sð Þ
ds:
Hence, as in the other market indices, varieties' costs are weighted
by the taste distribution in the country of destination. The interpretation
is that efﬁciently produced varieties may have a low impact on the cost
index when they have a bad match with local taste. In sum, eachdestination country is characterized by a different set of market aggre-
gates (ℕi, Ai, ℂi, and ℙi), which are all weighted by the destination-
speciﬁc taste distribution.
2. Market equilibrium
The market process is described by an aggregative game involving a
continuum of players (the variety suppliers) and a single market aggre-
gate ℙi per destination country. The equilibrium outcome is given by a
Nash equilibrium, which is determined as follows. Plugging Eq. (9)
into Eq. (8), we obtain the equilibrium price of variety s in country i:
pi sð Þ ¼
α sð Þ þ c sð Þ
2
−Ti
αi−ci
2
ð10Þ
whereαi is the average effective quality in country i of varieties present
in this country and ci is the average effective marginal production cost
of the varieties present in country i, be they domestically produced or
imported:
αi ≡Ai=ℕi; ci ≡ℂi=ℕi
while
τi ≡
γℕi
2þ γℕi
∈ 0;1½ :
Clearly, the equilibrium price of a single variety depends on themar-
ket aggregates Ai, ℂi and ℕi, which in turn depend on the whole distri-
bution of the taste mismatch parameter βi(⋅) as well as on the cost
(c(⋅)) and quality (α(⋅)) parameters of the competitors in country i.
As for the parameter τi, it reﬂects the toughness of competition in
country i, which can make the equilibrium price range from perfect
competition to pure monopoly. This is an important additional feature
of the preferences presented in this paper: it offers the possibility of
studying different types of market structure in trade models by varying
the toughness of competition. To see this, consider the following exam-
ple. When γℕi is arbitrarily small, which means that variety s has only
poor substitutes in country i, each variety is supplied at its monopoly
price because T i→0. On the other hand, when T i→1, country i is
crowded by many good substitutes, which means that the market out-
come converges toward perfect competition.
The beneﬁts of assuming that γ is the same between any pair of va-
rieties are reaped by capturing the intensity of competition within a
particular product and country through T i . In addition, the toughness
of competition may vary from one country to another because T i de-
pends on the effective mass of competing varieties in each country,
which depends itself on the country-speciﬁc taste distribution.11
It follows from Eq. (10) that higher quality results in higher prices,
but the opposite need not hold. Prices can rise for other reasons such
as higher costs or lower competition. This points at the need to comple-
ment unit values with cost controls to properly measure quality at the
variety level, which is not always possible without access to additional
ﬁrm-level information.
Note also that the ﬁrst term of Eq. (10) is variety-speciﬁc (the pa-
rameters are all indexed s). These variety-speciﬁc determinants of
prices and per-capita quantities, such as cost and quality, do not vary
by destination country and inﬂuence prices and quantities in a similar
way in all countries. However, the second term in Eq. (10) is not
variety-speciﬁc but depends on destination market aggregates that are
identical for all the varieties (beer) sold in a particular country i. Since
12 The parameter β does not enter prices because ﬁrms in their proﬁt maximization
trade-off setting a higher price when taste is strong and having smaller sales, to setting
a price independent of taste but getting a large market share.
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the second term in Eq. (10) as amarket effect.
The (absolute) markup is given by
pi sð Þ−c sð Þ ¼
α sð Þ−c sð Þ
2
−Ti
αi−ci
2
: ð11Þ
As expected, the markup increases (decreases) with α(s) (c(s)).
More importantly, it also increases (decreases) with αi ciÞð . Hence,
when varieties available in country i have a high quality (a low cost)
and a good match with country i's consumer tastes, the price at which
variety s can be sold in country i is low. By contrast, when the same va-
rieties have a badmatch, variety s can be sold at a high price. Therefore,
quality as such is not enough for a variety to be successful in a speciﬁc
country. What Eq. (11) tells us is that the markup of a speciﬁc variety is
strongly affected by the way competing varieties meet consumers' tastes
in country i.
Last, suppose that the average effective quality Ai/ℕi increases by
Δ N 0. Then, if the quality upgrade Δs of variety s is such that
ΔsNT iΔ
its price and markup will increase, even though the quality upgrade Δs
may be lower than Δ. In contrast, if the quality upgrade of variety s is
smaller than τiΔ, then its markup and price will decrease, even though
the quality upgrade Δs is positive. Thus, what matters for the “competi-
tiveness” of aﬁrm is its relative quality at the level of the productmarket
(beer market).
Using the properties of linear demand functions, we readily verify
that the equilibrium output of each variety is given by
qi sð Þ ¼
1
βi sð Þ ½α sð Þ−c sð Þ2 −Tiαi−ci2 : ð12Þ
The ﬁrst term in parentheses on the right-hand side of Eq. (12)
is variety-speciﬁc, whereas the second term shows that quantities
shipped can differ across countries due to the (beer) market effect
that is common to all the varieties (beers) present in country i. Howev-
er, the entire expression in brackets is weighted by the taste parameter
βs,i, which is variety- and country-speciﬁc turning Eq. (12) into a non-
linear expression. The equilibrium quantity Eq. (12) can be rewritten
as a function of its price:
qi sð Þ ¼
1
βi sð Þ
pi sð Þ−c sð Þ
 
: ð13Þ
Combining Eqs. (10) and (12) also provides us with a description of
themarket outcomepredicted by ourmodel in terms of the export price
and quantity of a variety shipped by a ﬁrm to country i. The quantity
exported qi∗(s) differs depending on the characteristics of the destina-
tion country, which are captured here by a series of (beer) market ag-
gregates. Important to realize is that even when countries are identical
in terms of their size and the number of varieties sold, they can still
have very different demand for variety s due to the taste differences
(distribution of βi(s)) in different countries.
Using Eq. (13) shows that the proﬁts earned on variety s sold in
country i are as follows:
Πi sð Þ ¼
1
βi sð Þ
pi sð Þ−c sð Þ
 2
: ð14Þ
What this expression shows is that a variety can be very successful in
a particular country while doing poorly on another for reasons that are
both plausible and easy to pin down in our model, i.e., the quality of
the match with local tastes, consumer idiosyncrasies across countries,
and the toughness of competition within countries. Thus, a ﬁrm facing
similar markups in two countries may have different proﬁt levelsdepending on how much its product is liked in each country. In the
same vein, Eq. (14) also reveals that a variety may be sold at a high
markup, thus suggesting that its producer has much market power.
However, this variety may generate low proﬁts. As a result, the level of
a markup does not necessarily mean that the corresponding variety is sell-
ing well.
The selection issue in CES-like models requires a ﬁxed cost of
exporting. This is different in quadratic utility models. Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) already pointed out that with ﬁrm heterogeneity in
cost, selection and zero trade ﬂows may result from a cost above the
choke price in a country. The model we introduce here sheds additional
light on entry issues due to the role of taste. The novelty here is that, in
addition to low productivity, low quality and competition effects, ex-
ports of a variety may be zero because of its high taste mismatch in the
destination country. A zero trade ﬂow may thus stem from any of these
aforementioned reasons, or combination of them, thus rendering the
identiﬁcation of individual parameters problematic. This differs from
standardmodels inwhich productivity is themain parameter to explain
entry into export markets (Helpman et al., 2008).
The market effect implies that fob prices can differ depending on
destination countries through theβ-weightedmarket aggregates. How-
ever, βi(s) does not enter the price Eq. (10) directly, whereas it does
enter directly in the equilibrium quantity Eq. (12).12 This is important
for several reasons. First, it offers an opportunity for the identiﬁcation
of parameters α(s) and βi(s) based on the fact that taste affects directly
quantities but not prices. Second, it conﬁrms the interpretation of the
parameter βi(s) as capturing horizontal differentiation. Also, whereas
the price Eq. (10) is a linear and separable equation, the quantity
Eq. (12) is not. The reason is that βi(s) is both country- and variety-
speciﬁc.
Note that the equilibrium price of variety s is independent of βi(s)
because the price elasticity is independent of this parameter:
ϵi sð Þ ¼−
pi sð Þ
α sð Þ−γQi−pi sð Þ
:
Since βi(s) does not affect ϵi(s), it has no impact on pi(s). However,
the whole β-distribution matters for the elasticity because it inﬂuences
the equilibrium value of Qi, as shown by Eq. (7). This shows once more
how the variables of the model can be affected differently by the taste
mismatch parameter.
We summarize those results as follows.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium export prices depend on variety-speciﬁc cost
and quality as well as on the market-speciﬁc degree of competitiveness.
Market effects, which can be captured by taste-weighted price, quality
and cost indices as well as by the effective mass of competitors, vary with
the destination country, but are common to all varieties exported there.
Thus, export prices of the same variety across countries only vary through
market-speciﬁc effects.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium export quantities (sales) depend on market-
speciﬁc and variety-speciﬁc tastes. Thus, export quantities of the same vari-
ety across countries shows additional variability, as compared to prices, be-
cause of idiosyncratic tastes.
Based on the these propositions, we would expect the combination
of variety characteristics and country characteristics to be important
and to give a high goodness-of-ﬁt for prices, but a much lower
goodness-of-ﬁt for quantities (sales). This is what we will explore in
the next section.
14 The CN classiﬁcation is equal to the HS classiﬁcation at the 6 digit levels.
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An interesting feature of our model is that its parameters are identi-
ﬁable. The model's particular functional form allows researchers to di-
rectly measure quality differences between varieties in the same
destination country and to estimate the taste mismatch parameter at
the country–variety level. The parameter capturing country–variety-
speciﬁc taste mismatch, i.e. horizontal differentiation is the most easily
identiﬁable. To determine its value, we rewrite Eq. (13) and show it is
the ratio between each variety's markups and its quantities sold, at
any given point in time, t13:
βi;t sð Þ ¼
pi;t sð Þ−ct sð Þ
qi;t sð Þ
:
However, empirical identiﬁcation of the “tastemismatch” parameter
would require ﬁrm–product level information on costs or markups. But
this data is not available to us, and will not be pursued here. Instead, in
Section 4we use cross-sectional exporter data on prices and volumes of
variety-level shipments, to determine the plausibility of the verti-zontal
model in ﬁrst instance.
As for the parameter capturing variety-speciﬁc vertical differentia-
tion, it can be measured in relative terms. Note that α(s) is the value
in terms of numéraire attributed by consumers to the vertical character-
istics of a particular variety s. In relative terms, quality differentials be-
tween any couple of varieties (say, r and s) can be readily obtained by
exploiting the property that relative prices of different varieties in a
common destination country depend only upon differences in costs
and quality since both face the same market effects and thus they
drop out when looking at relative quality (as shown in Eq. (10)):
Δαt s; rð Þ ¼ αt sð Þ−αt rð Þ ¼ 2 pi;t sð Þ−pi;t rð Þ
h i
− ct sð Þ−ct rð Þ½ : ð15Þ
Measuring the distance between the quality of all the varieties,αt(s),
and the quality of the lowest-quality variety, αt(0), one could identify
the relative quality distribution of the varieties present in country i at
time t and eventually normalize it to have an idea of the relative distri-
bution of varieties' quality in a country. This means that no additional
information or indirect estimation methodology would be needed to
capture the relative quality of each variety in a country.
Empirical identiﬁcation of relative quality in Eq. (15) would also re-
quire detailed information on ﬁrm–product costs, which is not available
to us. Instead the main question we aim to address here is whether the
data at hand are supportive of the verti-zontal model. Or do the data
leanmore towards a standard quadratic utility (with or without quality
shifters) or towards a standard CES model (with or without quality) as
the underlying mechanism to explain ﬁrm–product price and quantity
variation across countries?
For this purpose we will use a simple goodness-of-ﬁt test of an em-
pirical approximation of both the price and quantity equation estimated
on cross-sectional data. This test offers an easy way to discriminate the
predictions that arise under verti-zontal preferences from othermodels.
4. Evidence on taste heterogeneity across countries
4.1. Data
We use data on ﬁrm–product–country trade ﬂows of Belgian ex-
porters. The data is composed of fob (free on board) export prices and
quantities by destination country. This allows us to compare prices
(unit values) and quantities of the same varieties across destinations
as well as prices and quantities of different varieties within the same13 Note that our approachwould be consistentwith the assumption of both linear or ice-
berg transport costs, as long as they are product-speciﬁc and do not vary by variety.destination. The Belgian export data are obtained from the National
Bank of Belgium's Trade Database and are a cross-section of the entire
population of recorded annualized trade ﬂows at the ﬁrm level by prod-
uct and destination. Exactly which trade ﬂows are recorded (i.e. wheth-
erﬁrms are required to report their trade transactions) depends on their
value and destination. For extra-EU trade (trade partner outside the EU
borders), all transactions with a minimum value of 1000 euros or
weight of more than 1000 kg have to be reported. For intra-EU trade,
(trade partner inside the EU borders), ﬁrms are only required to report
their export ﬂows if their total annual intra-EU export value is higher
than 250,000 euros. The products are recorded at 8-digit Combined No-
menclature (CN8).14 In most cases, CN8 output is measured in weight
(kilograms), but for a smaller set of products, quantities are also
expressed in units (liters, bottles, pairs etc.).15
Due to its hierarchical nature, CN8 products can also be classiﬁed as
products at more aggregate levels. For ﬁrms with primary activity in
manufacturing, the data includes more than 5000 exporters and over
7000 different CN8 products, exported to 220 countries, for a total of
more than 200,000 observations. We use cross-sectional export data
for the year 2005 from manufacturing ﬁrms for which both values and
quantities exported are reported. We do not have information on
other ﬁrm-characteristics.
With the data at hand we can combine a product category at 8-digit
level (CN8), say beer, with a ﬁrm-identiﬁer such that beers can be dis-
tinguished from one another by the ﬁrm they are exported by. These
ﬁrm–product combinations are allowed to enter consumer preferences
differently. Even with the very detailed product classiﬁcations that we
have in our data, one limitation is that it cannot be excluded that
there may still be heterogeneity within the 8-digit product category
that cannot be observed (e.g., speciﬁc brands, distribution channels,
and so on). While most 8-digit products have a precise description, for
some products this is less the case. But what is important to keep in
mind is that, by linking the product to a ﬁrm, consumer preferences
are now allowed to differ between the various ﬁrm–product combina-
tions available in the country. In what follows we deﬁne a variety as a
ﬁrm–product combination. We consider each product (typically CN8)
as a separate productmarketwithinwhichwe canmeaningfully consid-
er the determinants of export prices and quantities across destinations
for varieties shipped from Belgium.
We use raw data on unit values and quantities and drop outliers at
the 1% of the distribution. The only data restrictions that we impose
are that, ﬁrst, each ﬁrm faces some competition in their own CN8 prod-
uct in a particular destination country and, second, that a variety is
exported to more than one country. In practice, we impose a minimum
of two ﬁrm–CN8 products to be present in the same destination and a
minimum of two export markets for each variety. In this way, we can
identify a variety- and a destination-speciﬁc effect in the regressions.
While results are not very sensitive to an increase in the number of com-
peting varieties per destination country, with each additional variety
that we require to be present in a country, the number of observations
for the regression falls substantially. Table 1 shows how the restricted
sample compares to the full sample for both weights and units.4.2. Goodness-of-ﬁt test
Eqs. (10) and (12) show that equilibrium prices and quantities con-
sist of a ﬁrst term, which is determined by ﬁrm–product level cost (c)
and quality (α), and a second term,which depends on destination coun-
try speciﬁc variables (indexed by i). Thus, variety-speciﬁc variation
(cost and quality) can be captured empirically by ﬁrm–product ﬁxed15 Measurement error that can plague quantity measurement should be lower when
output is measured in units be it that the number of observations is much lower. For this
purpose we report results both for units and weights.
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by country–product ﬁxed effects.
The following empirical speciﬁcation where we regress individual
ﬁrm–product prices (ys,i = ps,i) and quantities (ys,i = qs,i) on variety
and destination dummies allows for an easy way to discriminate be-
tween the verti-zontal and the other models:
ys;i ¼ δ0 þ δ1Firm Products þ δ2Country Producti þ ϵs;i: ð16Þ
In the regressions we use alternatively price (ps,i) and quantity (qs,i)
level data as dependent variables. Every variety s in (16) belongs to the
same product-market S, which corresponds to a CN8 product category.
The equilibrium price Eq. (10) implies that ﬁrm–product quality and
cost affect prices in a similar and linear way. So, even without identify-
ing quality and without disentangling quality and cost, a simple OLS re-
gression of export prices on ﬁrm–product dummies is expected to
capture this variation and to explain an important part of the price
data. Since cost and quality are variety-speciﬁc, ﬁrm–product dummies
should account for that.
According to the verti-zontal model, the other determinants of ex-
port prices are all country effects indexed by i in Eq. (10). These country
effects affect all varieties (ﬁrm–CN8) competing in the same country–
product in the same way and also enter the price equation in a linear
way. Since our trade data holds information on destinations, we can ap-
proximate country effects through country–product dummies. Based on
the theory, the joint inclusion of ﬁrm–product and country–product
dummies is expected to yield a good ﬁt in a regression on individual
ﬁrm–product prices.
In the verti-zontal model, the same set of variables is expected to
perform less well in explaining variation of quantities across countries.
In addition to quality, taste differences between consumers alsomatter.
This is expected to result in a very different ﬁt between price and quan-
tity regressionswherewe expect quantities to have a consistently lower
R2.
The reason is that quantities are not just a function of ﬁrm–product
cost and quality and country-level competition effects, but are also de-
termined by idiosyncratic taste βs,i that makes the quantity Eq. (12) a
non-linear one.
We do not log-linearize prices and quantities in Eq. (16), as for
example Bastos and Silva (2010) or Hallak and Sivadasan (2013)
do. That is because in our case, by using the raw data for unit values
and output, we impose a stricter test of the model since linearity of
demand is one of the speciﬁc implications of our model and it is
what distinguishes the price from the quantity regressions in
Eq. (16). Furthermore, taking logs would have been useful if we
had been interested in interpreting the speciﬁc regression coefﬁ-
cients, but this is not what we are after. Instead we focus on the
value of the R2 as a measure of the goodness-of-ﬁt in the
regressions.
As we will show in the regressions, the systematically lower R2 for
quantities than for prices in almost every product, industry and destina-
tion thatwe consider, is suggestive that quantities do not depend on the
same fundamentals as prices. Based on our theory, we consider taste
heterogeneity to be the underlying reason.
Unfortunately, a formal test on the signiﬁcance of differences in
R2 does not exist. Therefore, complementary to a goodness-of-ﬁt
test, we also present a correlation test (Section 4.5). Propositions 1
and 2 can also be formulated in terms of price and quantity correla-
tions across countries. The advantage of using correlations is that a
formal test statistic exist which allows us to formulate and test the
prediction of weaker quantity correlation across countries. While
the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of our model, we refrain
from considering it as conclusive that “taste” is the only missing
source of variation.4.3. Predictions from verti-zontal versus other models
What dowe expect to be the goodness-of-ﬁt of an empirical approx-
imation of both the price and quantity Eq. (16) estimated on cross-
sectional data? And how do the predictions under verti-zontal prefer-
ences differ from other models?
Let us start by considering the case of a standard CES model where
productivity is the only source of heterogeneity, as in Melitz (2003). In
such a model, prices are expected to differ between varieties but not
for the same variety across countries. Under a standard CES, fob export
prices are the same independently of the destination towhich the prod-
uct is shipped. Therefore, we would expect a variety-ﬁxed effect, which
accounts for cost heterogeneity between ﬁrms, to account for all the
variation in prices. This also applies to a CES model with consumer
taste draws, as in Bernard et al. (2011).
A CES model with taste draws by variety–country and a discrete
choice model with a different taste distribution per destination country
are closest to the verti-zontal model in rationalizing the stronger
quantity variability that we and others ﬁnd in the data. However, they
cannot explain the joint variability of prices and quantities described
below. A CES model with taste draws would predict that export prices
do not vary by destination country, while our data clearly shows they
do. In a discrete choice model, a stronger taste for a product would
also result in a higher price for that product, which would result in
strong price volatility and would render the goodness-of-ﬁt of Eq. (16)
for prices as low as for quantities, which is not what we observe in the
data.
Thus, based on a standard CES model (with or without taste draws),
we would not expect additional variability in fob prices to come from
country-ﬁxed effects or, alternatively, from more narrowly deﬁned
country–product ﬁxed effects.
For quantities, a standard CESmodel assigns a role to country effects,
driven by income differences across countries. Country ﬁxed effects
would also explain some of the variation in quantities. Thus, in a CES
model we would expect country dummies to raise the goodness-of-ﬁt
in the quantity regressions, but not in the price regression. In other
words, a CES model would predict a higher goodness-of-ﬁt for quanti-
ties, but this is not what we observe in the data.
In a CES model augmented with quality, as in Baldwin and Harrigan
(2011), the variety-ﬁxed effect would now account for both productiv-
ity and quality differences between ﬁrm–products. While the use of
variety-FE does not allowus to separate cost fromquality heterogeneity,
it does allow us to distinguish the type of quality differentiation that
ﬁrms are making. If ﬁrms ship the same quality to all destination coun-
tries, then the variety-ﬁxed effect would take up all the variation in
prices. In such a world, adding country-ﬁxed effects to the regression
would yield no additional explanatory power for prices, while it
would for quantities, as in the standard CES. But should ﬁrms ship a dif-
ferent quality of the same variety to different countries, this would cor-
respond to a parallel demand shifter that varies by country. In such a
model, we would expect this quality variation to be absorbed by
country-ﬁxed effects both for prices and quantities. Country-ﬁxed ef-
fects in the quantity regression would additionally also absorb income
differences between countries.
Thus, based on a CESmodel, irrespective of whether quality is intrin-
sic to a variety or depends on the destination country, wewould not ex-
pect a lower goodness-of-ﬁt of Eq. (16) in the quantity regression
compared to the price regression. Thus, the prediction from a CES
model is quite different from Proposition 1 derived from the verti-
zontal model.
What about a standard quadratic utility, as in Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008)? In such a model, both the equilibrium prices and quantities
are a linear combination of a variety-speciﬁc effect and a country-
effect. The variety effect captures heterogeneity in costs across ﬁrm–
products, while a country-effect captures competition effects that vary
by destination country. Based on a standard quadratic utility, price
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bination of variety–(ﬁrm–product) ﬁxed effects and country-ﬁxed ef-
fects. Thus, in contrast to the verti-zontal model, a standard quadratic
utility would predict both price and quantity dummy regressions on
variety and country ﬁxed effects to give an equally high goodness-of-ﬁt
measured by the R2.
A quadratic utility model augmented with quality would give a sim-
ilar prediction as a standard quadratic utility model. Quality acts as a
parallel demand shifter between varieties and possibly even within
varieties across countries. But this should not alter the equality in
goodness-of-ﬁt between a price and a quantity dummy regression.16
Therefore, even in a quadratic utility model with quality differentiation,
we would continue to expect an equally good ﬁt for price and quantity
regressions in dummy regressions on variety and country ﬁxed effects.
Thus, the verti-zontal model is the only model that predicts a sys-
tematically lower R2 in quantity regressions than in price regressions
when variety and destination effects are accounted for.
Under verti-zontal preferences, equilibrium quantities are deter-
mined by a non-linear combination of variety- and country–variety-
speciﬁc variables. This non-linearity in output is driven by the presence
of variety–country speciﬁc idiosyncratic taste, which can be seen from
Eq. (12). However, we continue to have a linear equilibrium price equa-
tion, where the taste parameter does not enter directly, leaving all the
variability to be explained by variety characteristics and country charac-
teristics. Therefore, to capture the variation in ﬁrm–product–country
prices (unit values) with a linear combination of variety- and country
ﬁxed effects is expected to yield a high goodness-of-ﬁt in the price equa-
tion. In contrast, trying to ﬁt a linear model on a combination of vari-
ables that are expected to behave in a non-linear way, as in the case of
ﬁrm–product–country quantities, is expected to yield a much lower
goodness-of-ﬁt. This result is not affected by selection issues because
variety characteristics are intrinsic to each variety in every destination
market while country characteristics affect all the varieties present in
a particular country in a symmetric way.17 A simple test where we ap-
proximate ﬁrm–product variation and country–product variation
through a set of dummies for each provides an easy and direct way of
discriminating between all the models discussed above.
Before discussing the results of the speciﬁcation Eq. (16), we ﬁrst
consider the within data variation explained by ﬁrm, product and
country-level effects alone. The highly disaggregate nature of our
trade data at the 8-digit CN level enables us to examine heterogeneity
of within-ﬁrm, within ﬁrm–product and within country–product unit
values and output across countries and to compare results to earlier
ﬁndings in the literature.
4. Results
4.1. Heterogeneity across ﬁrms, products and countries
In our dataset, quantities are expressed in weight (kilograms) or al-
ternatively in units (pairs, liters, and so on). The results for quantities
expressed in units are less likely to be plagued by measurement error
and as such we regard them as a robustness check. But we ﬁrst discuss
the results for products whose quantities are given in weights for which
we have many more observations. The results on the two samples are
shown in Table 2.
In column 1we include ﬁrm-ﬁxed effects (FE) to see howmuch data
variation in prices and quantities is explained by ﬁrm heterogeneity. In-
cluding ﬁrm-FE is equivalent to assuming that there is only one source16 In a standard quadratic utility, quantities are given by (p− c)/β, but since β is now a
constant it should not affect the R2, so wewould expect an equally good ﬁt in the quantity
regression as in the price regression.
17 We cannot run a selection model, like a Heckman two-stage model, since the second
stage does not allow us to compute a meaningful measure of the goodness-of-ﬁt which is
the measure we need to compare the variability explained in the price and quantity re-
gressions. But in the theory we show that our results do not depend on selection issues.of heterogeneity in the data and it works at the ﬁrm level, for example
when cost and quality differences are small between products of the
same ﬁrm but are signiﬁcant between products of different ﬁrms. The
results in column (1) do not conﬁrm this assumption. The inclusion of
ﬁrm-FE alone explains about a third (38%) of the variation in prices.
This ﬁnding is comparable to Munch and Nguyen (forthcoming) and
others.18 But while previous studies looked at sales variation, we sepa-
rate price from quantity variation. For quantities, ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects
explain much less of the variation. Only 16% to 19% are explained de-
pending on whether we measure output as “quantity per capita of the
destination country” or “quantity per dollar of GDP of the destination
country.” The variation that ﬁrm-FE explain of simple quantities is 17%
and lies between the other two output measures.
What about product-FE? In other words, howmuch of the variation
in ﬁrm–product–country prices is driven by the type of product.
Product-FE (columns 2 to 5) in the weight regressions, explain about
30% of price variability, but this varies substantially with the level of de-
tail at which we deﬁne a product. At the most disaggregate level (CN2-
FE) of a product deﬁnition products explain 18% of price variation and
about 4% of quantity variation. At the most detailed product deﬁnition
(CN8-FE), products explains 40% of price variation and about 12-15%
of quantity variation, depending on how we measure quantities.
Clearly, for a given product, export unit values exhibit substantial
variation. But the remaining variability is large and either comes from
differentﬁrm-level costs and quality or from different destination coun-
tries served by the ﬁrms selling the same product.
With country–product FE, the explained variability for quantities is
substantially higher (columns 6 to 9). For weights (Table 2), at the
most detailed product-level (country–CN8), 55% of export price vari-
ability and 32% to 48% of quantity variability are explained. The R2 for
price and quantities in general are closer together when country–prod-
uct ﬁxed effects are considered. This is not a surprise and is consistent
with both the verti-zontal and CES models. In the verti-zontal model
country–product dummies which capture destination country-effects
affect both prices and quantities. But country–product effects, at least
in part, also capture taste heterogeneity since taste varies across coun-
tries. Taste is inherently non-linear, therefore we expect the country-
dummies, which are parallel shifters, to capture quantity variation
only in part. This is especially true when we consider “quantities per
dollar of GDP of the destination country” where we already divide the
dependent variable output by a country-speciﬁc variable.
With ﬁrm–product FE as the sole regressors (columns 10 to 13), the
variability explained is also high compared to ﬁrm-level FE. This sup-
ports the assumptions made earlier in Sections 2 and 3 that most varia-
tion in quality and unit cost was at ﬁrm–product level. This assumption
allows making predictions independent of the single- or multi-product
nature of ﬁrms. Empirically, however, that assumption needs to be
veriﬁed. At the most detailed level (ﬁrm–CN8), the explained price var-
iability of observations in weight is now about 67%, while for quantities,
the explained variability with the inclusion of ﬁrm–product FE explains
about 33%, depending on how quantities are measured. Thus, the inclu-
sion of a ﬁrm–product FE explains much more variability in both the
price and quantity regressions than either ﬁrm-FE or product-FE. This
justiﬁes a theoretical approach that allows demand to vary by ﬁrm–
product rather than by ﬁrm or by product only.19
Turning to products whose quantities are expressed in units, in the
bottom of Table 2 we notice that all FE explain more of the variation
in the data, but it should be kept in mind that the number of observa-
tions and varieties in units are much lower, as shown in Table 1. For18 Munch and Nguyen (forthcoming) ﬁnd that ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects explain 31% of un-
conditional export sales variation of Danish ﬁrms. Eaton et al. (2011) France ﬁnds that var-
iation of sales conditional upon entry explains 39% of variation. Lawless and Whelan
(2008) for Irish ﬁrms ﬁnd ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects to account for 41% of ﬁrm destination sales
variation.
19 Munch and Nguyen (forthcoming) using Danish export data also point out that the
ﬁrm-product dimension is important to explain data variation.
Table 1
The full and restricted data sample of Belgian ﬁrm–product–country exports.
Weight Units
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample Restricted sample Full sample Restricted sample
Observations 239,127 111,876 52,227 20,929
Firms 5386 3528 2521 1067
CN2 products 95 89 56 46
CN4 products 1159 755 315 182
CN6 products 4122 1999 1161 494
CN8 products 7051 2691 1922 604
Firm–CN2 combinations 20,358 8835 4844 1748
Firm–CN4 combinations 36,709 13,333 7000 2320
Firm–CN6 combinations 50,234 17,759 10,243 3454
Firm–CN8 combinations 62,355 19,612 12,842 3703
Destinations 220 139 206 108
CN2–destination combinations 8283 3646 3236 1214
CN4–destination combinations 38,924 13,089 9404 2544
CN6–destination combinations 78,997 23,738 19,500 4908
CN8–destination combinations 107,681 28,343 26,538 5548
Trade volume (bill. euros) 88.10 27.02 23.91 8.78
Destinations per ﬁrm–CN8
Mean 3.84 5.71 4.07 5.65
Median 1 3 1 4
Min 1 1 1 1
Max 160 67 118 60
Firms per CN8-destination
Mean 2.22 3.95 1.97 3.77
Median 1 3 1 3
Min 1 2 1 2
Max 235 192 113 76
Notes: “Weuse raw data on unit values and quantities dropping outliers at the 1% of the distribution. To be able to identify a variety-speciﬁc and amarket-speciﬁc effect in the regressions,
in the restricted sample we impose a minimum number of two markets for each ﬁrm–CN8 product and a minimum of two ﬁrms for each country–CN8 market.”
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gressions with units than with weights. But more importantly, the
difference in R2 between the price and the quantity regression is consis-
tently present with a lower R2 in the quantity regressions. For observa-
tions in units, which are arguably less subject to measurement errorTable 2
Single-attribute models and goodness-of-ﬁt for pooled observations in weight and units.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p,
Firm FE Yes
Product (CN2) FE Yes
Product (CN4) FE Yes
Product (CN6) FE Yes
Product (CN8) FE Yes
Country–CN2 FE Yes
Country–CN4 FE
Country–CN6 FE
Country–CN8 FE
Firm–CN2 FE
Firm–CN4 FE
Firm–CN6 FE
Firm–CN8 FE
Weight
Price reg. R2 38.3% 18.5% 33.4% 37.9% 40.0% 23.6%
Quantity reg. R2 17.4% 4.2% 8.8% 11.2% 12.6% 9.1%
Q. per capita reg. R2 16.6% 4.2% 8.8% 10.9% 12.5% 14.2%
Q. per GDP reg. R2 18.9% 4.4% 11.3% 13.5% 15.6% 25.1%
Units
Price reg. R2 70.3% 37.1% 70.9% 76.5% 81.3% 43.5%
Quantity reg. R2 18.1% 5.1% 7.7% 10.2% 11.3% 12.9%
Q. per capita reg. R2 20.3% 6.6% 9.6% 11.7% 12.6% 20.2%
Q. per GDP reg. R2 20.1% 6.8% 10.9% 13.9% 14.8% 34.8%
Notes: the results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 1. Quanthan weights, the difference of goodness-of-ﬁt between prices and
quantity regressions is even larger.
Single-attribute models, like the ones in Table 2, leave a substantial
amount of variability unexplained, as also pointed out by Hallak and
Sivadasan (2013). However, unreported F-tests turn out to be(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
45.7% 52.7% 55.6% 53.2% 62.9% 66.5% 67.9%
19.6% 28.1% 32.6% 22.0% 26.2% 30.1% 32.5%
26.5% 34.9% 39.3% 21.7% 25.6% 29.1% 31.8%
38.6% 46.0% 48.9% 24.9% 28.8% 31.9% 34.3%
79.7% 84.8% 86.7% 81.1% 86.1% 89.9% 91.8%
20.0% 28.0% 32.8% 20.8% 23.5% 26.3% 28.7%
30.4% 37.1% 40.4% 23.5% 25.9% 28.7% 30.1%
42.3% 50.3% 52.1% 23.1% 25.8% 30.1% 30.7%
tities expressed in weight (kilograms) or units (liters, bottles, pairs etc.).
Table 3
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) in dummy regressions.
(1) Price regression y = p
Mean sum of squares
Weight Units
Firm–CN8 FE 7401 923,217
Country–CN8 FE 14,510 3,285,966
Quantity regression y = q
Mean sum of squares
Firm–CN8 FE 3.0467e+11 1.0277e+11
Country–CN8 FE 4.1216e+11 1.1867e+11
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 1,
for quantities expressed in weight and units. The results refer to the dummy regressions
including ﬁrm–CN8 and country–CN8 FE.
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that ﬁrm–product and country–product are both important regressors
to include since each of them explains a signiﬁcant part of the variation
in the ﬁrm–product–country data. The F-tests for the price regressions
are always substantially higher than those for quantities, which is sug-
gestive that the linear functional form that we impose by including
the dummies is more suited to explain prices than quantities.20
However, from the single-attribute models in Table 2, we do not
know how important ﬁrm–product FE versus country–product FE are
in explaining data variability since a comparison of R2 across different
models is not meaningful.21 Firm–product and country–product FE
models both result in a high R2, especially with observations in units.
A variance decomposition analysis will help us to determine the relative
role of ﬁrm–product FE and country–product FE when included jointly
in the regression. At the same time, it will also help us to discriminate
quadratic utility models from CESmodels. Quadratic utility models pre-
dict that country effects are an important determinant of prices, while
CES type of models see no role for country-effects to explain prices.
In the ANOVA Table 3, we consider a combined attribute model of
ﬁrm–CN8 and country–CN8. The ANOVA decomposition should tell us
if a combined model is justiﬁed. Since the inclusion of ﬁrm–CN8 FE in-
volves a larger number of dummies (degrees of freedom) than in the
case of country–CN8 dummies, we may wrongly conclude that ﬁrm–
product FE explain more of the data variation. The ANOVA analysis
takes this different number of dummies into account such that we get
a better idea about the relative importance of each regressor.
The results in the top panel of Table 3 show the results for the price
regressions and the bottom panel for the quantity regressions. We re-
port the Mean Sum of Squares (MS), which is the outcome of dividing
the Partial Sum of Squares of each regressor (not shown for brevity)
by its degrees of freedom from the regressions. As such the MS gives
the explanatory power of each regressor per degree of freedom. Mea-
sured thisway, ﬁrm-CN8 FE and country–CN8 FE account for a relatively
even part of the variation explained, be it that the relative importance of
the regressors alternates between speciﬁcations. In the quantity regres-
sions, the importance of variety- versus country-FE is about even, while
in the price regressions, the country-FE appears to be more important
per degree of freedom.We do not explore this further since the relative
importance of variety- versus country-speciﬁc effects is beyond this
paper's objectives. More importantly, the ANOVA analysis conﬁrms
that the inclusion of both variety-effects and country-effects seemwar-
ranted when explaining price and quantity variation.2220 For brevity, the F-tests are not reported but are available upon request.
21 Only when the regressors are orthogonal and completely uncorrelated does the in-
crease in the R2 tell us what the contribution of each regressor is. But this is unlikely here.
22 Munch and Nguyen (forthcoming) argue that an ANOVA analysis in an unbalanced
dataset may bias results, which means we cannot draw too strong conclusions on the rel-
ative importance of variety-versus country-effects, other than that both seem needed.4.4.2. Combining variety and country dummies
The results associatedwith the single-attributemodels in Table 2 sug-
gest thatﬁrm–product and country–product dummies in isolation are rel-
evant regressors. The variance decomposition in Table 3 suggests that the
combination of the two is necessary to explain the data variability.
The results of combining variety and country dummies to explain
price and quantity variation are shownmore systematically and for dif-
ferent product-level deﬁnitions in Table 4. In this Table we show the re-
sults of regressions where we pool data over all product categories,
essentially assuming a singlemarket inwhich all goods compete and in-
sert ﬁrm–product and country–product dummies. We progressively
narrow the deﬁnition of a product-market starting with ﬁrm–CN2 and
move towards ﬁrm–CN8.
Independent of the product-market deﬁnition, we see that the vari-
ability explained in the price regression is always higher than in the
quantity regressions. In theweights regressions, the difference between
price and quantity regressions' R2 is about 20% to 40%, while for the
units' regressions in the bottom panel the difference is closer to around
40%. In the units' regressions, the variation in the quantity regression
explained is typically less than half of what is explained by the same
two sets of dummies in the price equation. It is worth noting that the
ﬁner the ﬁrm–product and country–product deﬁnition, the better the
goodness-of-ﬁt for both the price and quantity regressions. But this
can be attributed to the fact that more dummies also imply less residual
degrees of freedom in the regression which tends to raise the R2.
Two important insights emerge from the combined-attribute models
in Table 4. First, while price variability is pretty much pinned down by a
combination of variety and country dummies, quantity variability is less
so. This is in sharp contrast to models that predict that prices and quanti-
ties should be perfectly correlated as they are supposedly determined by
the same sources of variability, as in the standard quadratic utility setting.
In addition it is in contrast with models predicting that destination-
speciﬁc characteristics are the only additional source of variability when
moving from prices to quantity equations, such as the CES. But our data
seem to suggest that different sources of variability are at work, being
destination-variety speciﬁc and affecting quantities rather than prices.
Second, the empirical results show that the linear functional form that
we imposed in Eq. (16) gives a good ﬁt for prices but a consistently
lower ﬁt for quantities. This is in line with what we expect since the
verti-zontal theory suggests that a linear form applies to prices but not
to quantities which are inherently non-linear.
4.4.3. Regressions by products and industries
Pooling all the data, aswe did until now, is similar to considering the
product market as one integrated market which may hide heterogene-
ity between industries. For this reason in Table 5 we report results for
Eq. (16) based on product-level regressions.
Based on the results thus far we can say that including both variety-
and country-FE at the most detailed product (CN8)-level is the speciﬁ-
cation that works most against our results since the price and quantity
regressions for thismost detailed deﬁnition of a productmarket lie clos-
est to each other. Therefore we will work with this speciﬁcation to give
the data most chance to overthrow our theory.
In Table 5, we ﬁrst consider all ﬁrm–CN8 varieties belonging to the
same CN2 and exported to the same country to be in competition
with each other in every country they are exported to. Put differently,
we start by considering CN2 as the relevant product market where all
goods are substitute products. This results in about 90 different CN2
product markets for weights and about 45 different CN2 industries for
units. For each of these industries we run separate regressions of price
and output on variety and country–product FE.23
Column 1 of Table 5 reports the weighted average R2 across all CN2
industries which is 65% for prices and about 36% for simple quantities.23 In the product-level regressions we deﬁne the country-product at country-CN2 in the
CN2 regressions, at country-CN4 in the CN regressions and so forth.
Table 5
Product-level regressions and goodness-of-ﬁt for weight and units.
(1) (2) (3)
Weighted averages How often price R2 Nquantity R2 Number of products
Weight Units Weight Units Weight Units
By CN2
Price R2 65.3% 74.0% – – 89 46
Quantity R2 36.3% 36.9% 93.3% 82.6% 89 46
Q per capita R2 37.5% 40.6% 87.6% 84.8% 89 46
Q per unit of GDP R2 42.4% 44.7% 84.3% 80.4% 89 46
By CN4
Price R2 65.4% 69.5% – – 740 178
Quantity R2 39.4% 41.4% 83.2% 79.8% 740 178
Q per capita R2 42.5% 45.8% 81.8% 78.7% 740 178
Q per unit of GDP R2 46.2% 49.6% 78.5% 78.7% 740 178
By CN6
Price R2 65.7% 71.4% – – 1930 482
Quantity R2 44.3% 47.7% 77.5% 78.6% 1930 482
Q per capita R2 48.7% 51.3% 75.2% 75.9% 1930 482
Q per unit of GDP R2 51.5% 55.2% 73.4% 74.1% 1930 482
By CN8
Price R2 66.4% 71.4% – – 2541 589
Quantity R2 46.5% 49.9% 77.2% 78.6% 2541 589
Q per capita R2 50.6% 53.2% 74.9% 76.2% 2541 589
Q per unit of GDP β 53.1% 56.5% 72.6% 74.4% 2541 589
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 1, for quantities expressed in weight (kilograms) and units (liters, bottles, pairs etc.). The only
additional restriction, per CN product, is that the number of regressors for each type of dummy is lower than the number of observations to ensure some variability in the sample. The
regressors included are ﬁrm–CN8 and country–CN FE, for the different CN product categories. For each CN product category, averages of all the CN products areweighted by their number
of observations. Results on prices are reported in bold.
Table 4
Goodness-of-ﬁt of the verti-zontal model for weight and units.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q
Firm–CN2 FE Yes
Firm–CN4 FE Yes
Firm–CN6 FE Yes
Firm–CN8 FE Yes
Country–CN2 FE Yes
Country–CN4 FE Yes
Country–CN6 FE Yes
Country–CN8 FE Yes
Weight Units Weight Units Weight Units Weight Units
Price regression R2 55.7% 83.1% 70.9% 91.2% 76.9% 95.1% 79.1% 96.0%
Quantity regression R2 28.6% 31.3% 40.3% 39.7% 50.7% 48.9% 56.7% 54.8%
Q per capita regression R2 31.6% 36.7% 43.5% 46.6% 53.4% 54.6% 59.1% 58.5%
Q per GDP regression R2 39.6% 44.5% 51.7% 52.5% 60.0% 62.9% 63.7% 64.7%
Number of observations 111,876 20,929 111,876 20,929 111,876 20,929 111,876 20,929
Number of dummies 12,482 2963 26,423 4865 41,498 8363 47,956 9252
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 1, for quantities expressed in weight (kilograms) and units (liters, bottles, pairs etc.).
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74% for prices and around37% for simple quantities regressions.24 Column
2 of Table 5 shows the percentage of times that the goodness-of-ﬁt in the
price regressions exceeds that of the quantity regressions, which is
around 93% for weight and 82% for units' regressions when considering
simple quantities.25 We subsequently narrow the deﬁnition of a relevant
product market from CN4, CN6 to CN8. Even in the most narrow product
market deﬁnition, where we consider 1701 separate regressions for each
of the CN8 industries considered (weights),weﬁnd theweighted average
R2 for prices to be 66% and for simple quantities to be 46%. Column (3)
shows that in 77% of the 1701 regressions that we ran, the goodness-of-
ﬁt in the price regression is strictly higher than that of the simple quantity
regressions. Results are qualitatively the samewhen considering varieties24 For each CN product category averages are weighted by the number of observations,
but results are very similar for weighted and simple averages.
25 Results are very similar for the unweighted averages and will be suppressed. They are
available upon request.in units. Results do not differ much when we measure output in a differ-
entway, although R2 tend to go up slightlywhen considering quantity per
capita or quantity per dollar of GDP.
Regressions at product-level thus conﬁrm our prediction that a line-
ar model, like the one in Eq. (16), appears to have less predictive power
in quantity regressions. While this holds for the large majority of prod-
ucts that we consider, from column (3) in Table 5 it is clear that there
are instances where there is not always a positive difference between
price and quantity R2. Our theory does not rule out the existence of
products where taste differences are not very important or where
business-to-business sales are more important than business-to-
consumer.26 Put differently, in the case of intermediate products the
cost-minimizing combination of inputs in production functions26 Similar R2 in prices and quantities could point at the absence of taste heterogeneity. A
higher R2 in the quantity regression than in the price regressions correspondswith predic-
tions of a quality augmented CES model with quality differences for the same product by
destinations.
Table 6
Industry-level regressions and goodness-of-ﬁt for weight and units.
Industries
(CN2 product codes)
Exports in weight Exports in units
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R-squared price
regression
R-squared quantity
regression
Obs. # (model degrees
of freedom)
R-squared price
regression
R-squared quantity
regression
Obs. # (model degrees
of freedom)
Agriculture 81.5% 35.5% 6821 – – –
CN2 codes 1 to 15 (1420) –
Food and beverages 78.9% 33.6% 11,625 62.0% 44.4% 1204
CN2 codes 16 to 24 (2047) (271)
Minerals and chemicals 76.8% 37.1% 16,277 36.2% 55.5% 344
CN2 codes 25 to 38 (2649) (129)
Plastics and rubber 56.7% 34.3% 16,641 65.1% 36.2% 583
CN2 codes 39 and 40 (2760) (183)
Leather, skins and wood 78.5% 42.3% 2353 91.6% 34.3% 1220
CN2 codes 41 to 46 (562) (299)
Articles of paper 50.4% 37.5% 5843 83.3% 59.8% 16
CN2 codes 47 to 49 (1257) (12)
Textile articles 86.9% 35.8% 13,544 89.0% 26.8% 12,276
CN2 codes 50 to 63 (2679) (2165)
Footwear and accessories 73.3% 48.1% 322 71.1% 35.5% 356
CN2 codes 64 to 67 (97) (106)
Construction materials 75.5% 45.9% 2757 76.8% 42.8% 1114
CN2 codes 68 to 70 (612) (245)
Base metals and jewelry 75.5% 40.6% 10,859 77.3% 32.5% 274
CN2 codes 71 to 83 (2395) (88)
Mechanical appliances 59.4% 29.0% 17,672 85.4% 38.1% 2884
CN2 codes 84 and 85 (3369) (731)
Transport equipment 75.8% 40.2% 2160 95.3% 52.8% 330
CN2 codes 86 to 89 (492) (129)
Precision instruments 62.7% 30.9% 2128 86.8% 36.9% 550
CN2 codes 90 to 93 (498) (169)
Furniture and toys 68.6% 27.1% 5162 69.1% 27.0% 299
CN2 codes 94 to 96 (980) (85)
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 1, for quantities expressed in weight (kilograms) and units (liters, bottles, pairs etc.). As regressors
we include ﬁrm–CN8 and country–industry FE. The industry “Agriculture” has been dropped from the sample because it had only 4 observations and the same number of dummies.
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sumers. Our model is more likely to explain price and quantity vari-
ation of ﬁnal consumption goods than of intermediate goods.
To have a ﬁrst indication for which industries taste differences seem
tomatter less,we report in Table 6 industry-level regressions, whereweNotes: The countries considered are: France, Netherlands, Germany, US, Canada, Brasil,
South Africa, Australia, Turkey, China, India, Japan. The square dots indicate pairwise price
rank correlations for all the 66 country pair combinations, triangle dots indicate quantity rank
correlations. The horizontal line segments represent averages: the solid red for the prices, the
dashed blue for the quantities. For illustration purposes, country pairs have been sorted in
decreasing quantity rank correlation order. The shaded area covers the three pairs EU
countries: France-Netherlands; Germany-France; Germany-Netherlands.
Fig. 1. Pairwise rank correlations for a sample of the 12 relevant export markets selected
from across the globe. Notes: The countries considered are: France, Netherlands,
Germany,US, Canada, Brasil, South Africa, Australia, Turkey, China, India, Japan. The square
dots indicate pairwise price rank correlations for all the 66 country pair combinations, tri-
angle dots indicate quantity rank correlations. The horizontal line segments represent av-
erages: the solid red for the prices, the dashed blue for the quantities. For illustration
purposes, country pairs have been sorted in decreasing quantity rank correlation order.
The shaded area covers the three pairs EU countries: France–Netherlands; Germany–
France; Germany–Netherlands.group the CN2 products by the sections to which they belong in the
RAMON Eurostat classiﬁcation.
For the fourteen so-obtained industries, the regressions for weights
do not reject our model. The R2 for prices is typically 20% to 30%
higher than for quantities. Only for exports in units for “Minerals and
Chemicals” the quantity regression shows a stronger goodness-of-ﬁt.Fig. 2. The spatial metaphor of verti-zontal preferences.
64 F. Di Comite et al. / Journal of International Economics 93 (2014) 50–66This may suggest that taste effects are not important in this industry or
that “Minerals and Chemicals” is more of a business-to-business indus-
try for which our model may not apply.
More detailed industry studies will likely reveal where taste hetero-
geneity is strong andwhere it is not orwhere other factors are at play. In
any case, all the evidence presented above seems to suggest that in the
large majority of products and industries, taste heterogeneity matters
since that is today the only model which can explain consistently
lower R2 of speciﬁcation (16) in quantity regressions than in price
regressions.4.5. Robustness: correlations and remote destinations
A legitimate concern is whether our results are not driven by the
fact that the most important trading partners for Belgium are
European, which may have a dampening effect on price differences.
If the high goodness-of-ﬁt in the price regressions is the result of ar-
bitrage or lack of border controls, this could drive the results. There-
fore, as a consistency check, we investigate whether this trade
orientation towards European destinations may have affected our
results.
We do so by looking at a set of heterogeneous and remote countries
(Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Africa, Turkey, and
US)27 together with the three main trading partners of Belgium
(France, Netherlands and Germany). For these countries we consider
pairwise bilateral correlations for each country-pair of Belgian export
prices and quantities shipped. An advantage of using correlations is
that differences can be statistically tested for. But for pairwise correla-
tions to be meaningful, we exclude zero trade ﬂows here and only
consider those varieties that are present in all countries. This results in
a balanced panel of 87 varieties and 1044 observations.28
These pairwise correlations all lie around 90%, which is the aver-
age of all the bilateral price rank correlations considered and is indi-
cated by the solid line at the top of Fig. 1. Proposition 1, which
predicts that the price rankings of varieties within destination coun-
tries will not be affected by country effects, is conﬁrmed by the high
price correlation we ﬁnd. Therefore, we would expect stable price
rankings amongst a set of varieties exported even when the destina-
tion countries are remote and heterogeneous compared to the coun-
try of origin.
In contrast, the bilateral quantity ranking correlations given by
the triangle dots in Fig. 1, can be as low as 50% as indicated by the
dashed horizontal line segment, which is what we expect on the
basis of Proposition 2. The four most correlated country pairs in
terms of quantity ranks correspond to the three EU member states
considered (France, Netherlands and Germany) and Turkey, a candi-
date EUmember country. Of all the countries included, the ones with
the highest pairwise quantity rank correlations are the three
European countries. This can clearly be seen from Fig. 1 where EU
countries are circled. Fig. 1 thus suggests that taste differences are
smallest in the three EU countries included, which seems quite plau-
sible given their proximity. All the quantity correlations are lower
than price correlations in a statistically signiﬁcant way at a 1% conﬁ-
dence level.
The evidence in Fig. 1 casts further doubt on measurement error in
quantities as an alternative explanation for our ﬁndings. Measurement
error would result in random variability in quantities, but Fig. 1 clearly
shows that quantity variation is lower in nearby countries. This makes
an explanation like “taste” more plausible as a source of quantity27 The criteria for choosing these countries included amaximumdistance from Belgium,
including asmany different continents as possible and conditioning on the fact that coun-
tries received the same set of varieties exported from Belgium.
28 The lower quantity correlations, which we ﬁnd in this balanced sample, are in line
with the goodness-of-ﬁt results obtained on the unbalanced sample in the previous sec-
tion. This conﬁrms that selection issues are not driving our results.variation thanmeasurement error, althoughwe cannot exclude thepos-
sibility that measurement error would increase with distance from
Belgiumwhichwould raise the variance of quantities for far away coun-
tries. Providedmeasurement error is not driving results, Fig. 1 also sug-
gests that taste and distance to destination may be highly correlated,
which raises some doubts on the correct speciﬁcation of many gravity
models where distance typically features as the prominent explanation
explaining bilateral trade ﬂows but which may in part capture taste ef-
fects that run along similar dimensions. This is another reason why fu-
ture research should be focussing on separating taste effects in trade
from other potential explanations at work.
5. Conclusions
This paper departs from standard speciﬁcations of preferences used
in trade models by enriching the demand side. We deviate from the as-
sumption that all substitute varieties within the same country face the
same demand, and instead we allow for two sources of heterogeneity.
First, varieties sold in the same country are allowed to be vertically dif-
ferentiated as well as to have a different match with local consumers'
tastes. Second, the same variety sold in different countries is allowed
to face a different demand depending on the interactions between
local tastes and competition effects. This leads to a new and tractable
framework in which taste heterogeneity interacts with cost and quality
heterogeneity. We call it a verti-zontal model to stress its vertical and
horizontal attributes. Our model displays enough versatility to be
applied to a wide range of new issues.
An important prediction arising from taste heterogeneity in con-
sumer preferences is thatﬁrm–product–country exports can be idiosyn-
cratic and display additional variability even after controlling for ﬁrm-
product speciﬁc productivity and parallel demand shifters. Detailed
ﬁrm–product–country data for Belgian exporting ﬁrms conﬁrm this
prediction, which the model rationalizes as the outcome of taste differ-
ences unrelated to destination market size or income differences. This
missing source of variation cannot be rationalized by any type of prefer-
ences used inmodels based on productive efﬁciency nor bymodels that
rely on efﬁciency and quality, but can be captured by the new prefer-
ences we propose here. When empirically controlling for country-
level differences, we still ﬁnd quantity variation, which the theory we
put forward rationalizes as taste differences.
However, we do not claim that taste heterogeneity is the only possi-
ble explanation for the sales variation of ﬁrm–products across countries.
For thatwewould have to distinguish consumer taste fromother poten-
tial sources of quantity variability, such as variation in distribution
networks (Arkolakis, 2010) or demand build-up over time (Foster
et al., 2012). This requires the speciﬁcation of new models focusing on
alternative explanations as well as their comparison to pin down their
respective merits. This may, however, prove difﬁcult as such alterna-
tives may be highly correlated with taste factors, which are less directly
observable. For example, the absence of a distribution network for a
given variety may stem from the mismatch between the variety and
local tastes. All that we claim here is that asymmetric preferences and
heterogeneous tastes across countries can rationalize the data as a poten-
tial source of quantity variation.
Future research can be directed towards the empirical identiﬁcation
of the demand parameters involved in the verti-zontal model such as
the identiﬁcation of the taste parameter, clearly distinguished from
the quality parameter. This calls for an external validation similar to
the approach of Crozet et al. (2012) who use an external classiﬁcation
of champagne to calibrate the productivity and quality parameters
using CES preferences. The quality and taste parameters arising from
the verti-zontal model would then become available for a much wider
set of product markets, including those for which external quality and
taste indicators do not exist. Also, the empirical identiﬁcation of the de-
mand parameters can then be used to strip price indices from quality
and taste changes to get better estimates of GDP growth indicators as
65F. Di Comite et al. / Journal of International Economics 93 (2014) 50–66currently also pursued by Feenstra and Romalis (2012) who use a dif-
ferent model.Appendix A. The micro-foundations of taste mismatch
To show how β(s) can be interpreted as a taste mismatch between
variety s and the consumer's ideal, we use a spatial metaphor based
on the Hotelling (1929) model that has been used extensively in the
industrial organization and marketing literature. In this metaphor, con-
sumers are located on a unit line segment with a shop located at each
end. The consumer's location on the line determines the distance she
has to walk to the shop where she buys one unit of a good. The distance
traveled corresponds to the consumer's taste mismatch between her
ideal variety, given by the consumer's location and the variety on offer
in the shop. In Fig. 2, we depict such a setting in which two varieties/
shops, indexed s= 1,2, are located at the endpoints 0 and 1. Normaliz-
ing the transport rate at 1, β1 ≡ β(1) is the distance between the con-
sumer and shop 1. In other words, a high (low) value of β1 amounts
to saying that the consumer is far from (close to) shop 1. The further
the consumer is from the shop, the lower her utility from consuming
the good, due to the disutility of traveling a long distance. Moreover,
β2 ≡ β(2) = 1 − β1 N 0 is the distance between our consumer and
shop 2. When preferences are symmetric, the consumer is located at
β1 = β2 = 1/2.
We now show that this distance in the Hotelling spatial model cor-
responds with the parameter β(s) in the quadratic preferences. When
preferences exhibit a love-for-variety as in Eq. (2), consumers may
visit several shops and can buy several units (see Hart, 1985) of different
varieties of a good. To facilitate the analogy between the Hotelling
model and the quadratic preferences in Eq. (2), we make a simplifying
assumption where we limit the number of goods in Eq. (2) to two and
where we assume that α(1) = α(s) = α. Under this assumption, the
consumer's willingness-to-pay (WTP) is equal to α.
This allows us to drawan analogy betweenHotelling's spatialmodel,
where consumers are heterogeneous in one dimension, i.e. their loca-
tion, and the preferences in Eq. (2) in which varieties can differ along
several dimensions.
To explain this link we turn to Fig. 2 and consider to what the new
preferences in Eq. (2) correspond to. Assume ﬁrst that a particular con-
sumer i on the line considers buying variety 1. Because β1 b 1− β1, the
consumer located at β1 is willing to buy variety 1 ﬁrst if her distance to
shop 1 is smaller than α. For this to happen, the interval [1− α,α] must
benon-empty. In otherwords, theWTP for the differentiated goodmust
be sufﬁciently large. When β1 b α, the consumer visits shop 1.
While Hotelling's story stops here because consumers makemutually
exclusive purchases, this is not the case in love-for-variety preferences. As
long asα exceeds 1/2,29 there is a segment [1−α,α] inwhichbothα−β1
and α− (1− β1) are positive for any β1 ∈ [1− α, α]. Since consumers
have a love for variety, consumer iwants to visit both shops if she is locat-
ed in the segment [1− α,α]. However, for this to happen, when turning
to shop 2 wemust account that the consumer has already acquired one
unit of the good so that her WTP is now shifted downward by γ/2.
Therefore, the segment over which both shops are actually visited is
narrower than [1− α, α] and given by [1− α+ γ/2, α− γ/2]. Conse-
quently,when the consumer is located atβ1b 1−α+γ/2 (β1 N α− γ/2),
she visits shop 1 (2) only, whereas she chooses to visit both shops when
her locationbelongs to [1−α+γ/2,α− γ/2]. For this tobepossible, how-
ever, this interval must be non-empty, that is, the condition
2αN1þ γ29 When α b 1/2, a consumer located in the central area does not shop at all because both
her desirability of the differentiated good is low and her taste mismatch is high. In the
standard Hotelling framework, this corresponds to the case inwhich the price of the good
plus the transport cost borne by the consumer exceeds her reservation price.must hold. This is sowhen thedesirability of the differentiated good is high,
the substitutability between the two varieties is low, or both. Conversely, it
is readily veriﬁed that, regardless of her location, the consumer acquires a
single variety if and only if
γN2α−1:
In other words, when varieties in Eq. (2) are very good substitutes,
consumers choose to behave like in the Hotelling model: despite their
love for variety, they visit a single shop because the utility derived
from buying from the second shop is overcome by the cost of visiting
this shop.
The foregoing argument shows how the spatial model can cope
with consumers buying one or two varieties of the differentiated
good and how consumers' decisions to buy one or two varieties are
related to the taste mismatch with each variety. While we develop
the example for two varieties on offer, this can be extended to any
number of varieties. In particular, when consumers' ideal varieties
are described by means of n-dimensional vectors with n N 1, it is
readily veriﬁed that what we have said above can be extended by
considering n + 1 varieties in Rn.
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